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EU and UK Consumer Credit Regulation: Principles, Conduct, and Consumer 




The regulation of financial services is going through major reform both at European 
and national level.  This article examines the specific case of consumer credit, the new 
mortgage credit directive, and how European reforms in relation to secured lending on 
residential property are exhibiting signs of change of direction in relation to the basis 
of regulation of consumer credit. Whilst at EU level, legislative control is still sector 
specific, there is an observable shift in the UK towards a single regime for financial 
services.  An examination of the new directive is made, giving a comparison between 
this latest consumer credit initiative and concurrent reforms in the regulatory 
framework that are taking place in the UK. It examines the extent to which the EU 
and UK regulatory initiatives reflect similarity in approach, highlights potential 




As has been well documented, the regulatory framework of financial services in the 
UK has changed, as a result (at least in part) of the financial crisis. The aim is to 
strengthen the regulatory system, provide clarity in terms of responsibility and to 
introduce appropriate tools and flexibility for the new regulatory bodies. A further 
aspect to this reform is the fundamental change to the regulation of consumer credit, 
with the hope of bringing a ‘simpler, more responsive regime’.1 Responsibility for 
consumer credit regulation transferred from the Office of Fair Trading (‘OFT’) to the 
Financial Conduct Authority (‘FCA’) on April 1, 2014, so bringing the conduct of all 
financial services under one regulatory ‘roof’. However, the most radical element to 
the reform is that the present consumer credit legislation has, at least in some respects, 
been scrapped in favour of the rule-book regulatory regime, which currently applies to 
other financial services, under the auspices of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Dr Sarah Brown is a lecturer at the School of Law, University of Leeds. The author would 
like to thank Professor Andy Campbell for his comments on an earlier draft. All errors are of 
course the author’s own. This article is based on a paper given by the author at a conference at 
the University of Exeter on 17th December 2012- ‘Re-orientating Consumer Law: 
Simplification, Conceptualisation and Subsidiarity’. 
1 HM Treasury/BIS, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Consultation on Reforming 
the Consumer Credit Regime (2010) Foreword, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31894/10-
1160-new-approach-consultation-reforming-consumer-credit.pdf (last accessed 14 Mar. 
2014). 
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2000 (‘FSMA’).2 This will represent a sea change in approach to credit regulation 
from a ‘rules-based’ to ‘principles-based’ approach. 
These changes in the UK have been and are being brought about against a 
background, at EU level, of a fluid landscape containing a plethora of directives and 
regulation. In terms of the supervisory structure and macro-prudential regulation of 
banks/deposit holders there is pressure to move to a harmonised approach with 
innovations being discussed and agreed on over-arching supervisory frameworks and 
capital requirements. However, in terms of micro-prudential regulation beyond the 
supervisory processes,3 conduct of business and product control, there is defined 
sector-specific legislation, with consumer credit further separated from other financial 
services, as has been, until recently, the current position in the UK. With the 
introduction of the Directive on Credit Agreements Relating to Residential Property 
(‘CARRP’), commonly referred to as the Mortgage Credit Directive,4 further 
divisional control has been created. The Directive, adopted in February 2014, 
professes to promote an internal market in mortgage credit for residential immovable 
property.5 In addition, the Directive, reflecting the Consumer Credit Directive, has as 
its objectives, high levels of consumer protection, market stability and ensuring 
responsible creditor behaviour.6 However, whilst the Directive in some respects 
mirrors current consumer credit regulation, there is a differing approach to how 
control of secured lending is delivered, with the introduction of general principles and 
micro-prudential requirements. At a time, when in the UK the approach is moving 
towards a simpler,7 inclusive approach to the regulation of financial services, EU 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For the relevant policy documents see e.g. HM Treasury/BIS, A New Approach to Financial 
Regulation: Judgement Focus and Stability Cm 7874 (2010) paras 4.53–4.56; HM 
Treasury/BIS, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Securing Stability, Protecting 
Consumers Cm 8268 (2012) paras 1.17, 4.16–4.23, A 50–A 51. For the consultation papers 
see e.g. HM Treasury/BIS, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Consultation on 
Reforming the Consumer Credit Regime, supra n.1; HM Treasury/BIS, A New Approach to 
Financial Regulation: Transferring Consumer Credit to the Financial Conduct Authority 
(2013). For FSA and FCA policy papers see eg FSA Journey to the FCA (2012) 
https://www.fsa.gov.uk/fca; FCA Detailed Proposals for the FCA regime for consumer credit 
(2013) CP 13/10 https://www.fca.org.uk/statc/consultation-papers/cp-10.pdf.  
3 Micro-prudential supervision of the financial market is provided for by the European 
Banking Authority, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority. 
4 Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on 
credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending 
Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ L 60/34 
(2014) 
5 This however was met with some cynicism at the Proposal stage -see for example Opinion 
of the Committee on Legal Affairs for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 
the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit 
agreements relating to residential property (COM (2011) 0142, Rapporteur Alexandra Thein. 
6 Preamble paras 5–6. 
7 Specifically in relation to the consumer credit regime: HM Treasury Judgement Focus and 
Stability, supra n.2 para. 4.55. Policy objectives elsewhere are stated as being ‘clarity 
coherence and market oversight; effective and appropriate consumer protection…through a 
responsive and flexible framework;…simplification and deregulation; and a proportionate and 
cost effective regime’ HM Treasury Consultation on Reforming the Consumer Credit Regime, 
supra n.1, Executive Summary 5. In contrast the consultation paper in 2013 concentrates on 
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regulation, whilst taking a more inclusive direction in certain respects, seems firmly 
fixed in a ‘fragmented approach’ when it comes to consumer credit. This does not sit 
particularly well with the UK’s aim of a flexible market, and desire for proportionate 
and ‘manageable regulatory burden on business’.8 However, whilst it has been argued 
that, up until now, there has been a clear divergence in the underlying ethos between 
the EU and the UK in relation to the credit consumer,9 this latest initiative on 
mortgage credit signposts a perceptible shift in how credit is to be regulated in the 
EU, not only in terms of scope but also method. This may suggest, taken together with 
the fundamental changes being brought about in the UK, that convergence in EU and 
UK approaches rather than divergence is now in evidence. The purpose of this paper 
is to explore these latest developments in consumer law in relation to credit. It will 
make  making some observations about what this tells us about current approaches to 
protection of the credit consumer and will examine these trends in relation to EU and 
UK regulation, assessing whether there is an observable shift towards approximation 
in terms of rationale and how protection is to be achieved. 
Financial Services Regulation in the EU 
General Regulatory Framework 
EU regulation is broadly separated by the concepts of macro and micro prudential 
supervision and regulation, conduct of business regulation and specific product 
control. Prudential supervision of the financial services market is based in co-
ordination and co-operation with national supervisors10 under a strengthened 
supervisory framework, through an EU system of Financial Supervisors. There are 3 
European Supervisory Authorities: the European Banking Authority (‘EBA’), the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (‘EIOPA’), and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (‘ESMA’). The European Systemic Risk 
Board (‘ESRB’), with support from the European Central Bank (‘ECB’)  has the task 
of monitoring the system at a macro-prudential level. The latest developments are the 
agreement on and adoption of the single supervisory mechanism for credit 
institutions,11 and the ‘single rule book’,12 in effect  aiming for further harmonisation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
flexibility consumer protection and a well functioning market HM Treasury Transferring 
Consumer Credit to the Financial Conduct Authority, supra n. 2 para. 1.5. 
8 HM Treasury Consultation on Reforming The Consumer Credit Regime, supra n. 1 
Executive Summary. 
9 Sarah Brown, European Regulation of Consumer Credit: Enhancing Consumer Confidence 
and Protection from a UK Perspective? in James Devenney & Mel Kenny (eds), Consumer 
Credit, Debt and Investment in Europe (CUP 2012). 
10 As stated in a recent press release this is on the basis this will deliver consistent rule 
application and allow efficient monitoring of developments and risks within the system. The 
new EU supervisory bodies also have the authority to develop and impose standards and rules 
and have a dispute resolution and co-ordination role if relevant http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-11-49_en.htm (last accessed 14 Mar. 2014). 
11 Led by the ECB in conjunction with national supervisors. This is the creation of a Banking 
Union, underpinned by single supervisory and regulatory mechanisms, compulsory for 
Member States within the euro area, and optional for other Member States, and the single rule 
book, applicable to banks and large investment firms across all Members States: Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 
OJ L 287/63; Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European 
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within financial regulation of banks and investment firms by creating the Banking 
Union. The single rule book  has been produced as a result of both Regulation and 
Directive (in force from January 2014, and being phased in over a 5 year period)13 
covering BASEL III and the amendments to the Capital Requirements ‘package of 
regulation’ (CRD IV)14 together with further powers for supervisory bodies.15 The 
changes aim to ensure a robust financial system able to proactively defend against 
future crises.16 The recent review on the operation of the new supervisory 
framework17 is positive, but suggests further changes, both legislative and non- 
legislative may be required. As part of this, one area highlighted as needing 
improvement is the attention given to consumer protection by the European 
Supervisory Authorities.18 
 
Beyond the capital requirements of credit institutions, other prudential regulation19 
and/or conduct of business in relation to financial services in the European Union are 
covered by numerous directives and Regulations: for example the Market in Financial 
Instruments Directive, (‘MiFD ’),20 the Payment Services Directive,21 the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific 
tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, OJ 
L 287/5. http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/banking-union/index_en.htm (last 
accessed 2 May 2015) 
12 Being one of the main proposals of the Report of the high level group on financial 
supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacques De Larosiere (25 February 2009) 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf (last accessed 
14 Mar. 2014). 
13 http://www.wba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/implementing-basel-iii-europe (last 
accessed 14 Mar. 2014). 
14 These legislative packages provide minimum capital requirements and rules as to 
publication of e.g. capital and risk management for credit institutions and investment firms. 
15 ECB, ‘Financial Integration in Europe’ (April 2013) at 44, 48 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/financialintegrationineurope201304en.pdf (last 
accessed 14 Mar. 2014). 
16 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-915_en.htm?locale=en (last accessed 14 Mar. 
2014) ECB ‘Financial Integration in Europe’ 28 April 2015. 
17 Required by the Regulations founding the various supervisory bodies. The review is 
contained in the commission report Report from the commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the 
European System of Financial Supervision COM (2014) 509 final 
18 Ibid 8.	  
19 Whether macro or micro- for a discussion as to how regulation can be defined as serving 
either, see Itai Agur & Sunil Sharma Rules, Discretion, and Macro-Prudential Policy (IMF 
Working Paper 2013) http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1365.pdf (last 
accessed 14 Mar. 2014). 
20 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and 
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 93/22/EEC, OJ L 145. The Directive covers securities exchanges and investment 
firms whose occupation/business is to provide investment services and perform investment 
activities on a professional basis e.g. investment banks and portfolio managers. 
21Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 
on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC, OJ L 319. The Directive 
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Acquisitions Directive,22 the Re-insurance Directive,23 the Insurance Mediation 
Directive, (‘IMD’),24 the SOLVENCY II Directive,25 Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (‘UCITS’),26 the Alternative 
Investments Fund Managers Directive, (‘AIFMD’)27 the European Markets 
Infrastructure Regulation, (‘EMIR’),28 the Distance Marketing of Financial Services 
Directive (‘DMFSD’)29 and the Consumer Credit Directive (‘CCD’).30 There are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
provides for conduct and prudential requirements in relation to payment institutions. Reform 
is underway via the Payment Services Directive II -http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
13-730_en.htm?locale=en ( last accessed 3 May 2015) 
22 Directive 2007/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 
amending Council Directive 92/49/EEC and Directives 2002/83/EC, 2004/39/EC, 
2005/68/EC and 2006/48/EC as regards procedural rules and evaluation criteria for the 
prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase of holdings in the financial sector, OJ L 
247/1. This Directive governs acquisitions in the financial sector with prudential and 
procedural controls. 
23 Directive 2005/68/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 November 2005 on reinsurance and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 
92/49/EEC as well as Directives 98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC,  OJ L 323/1. This Directive 
regulates reinsurance firms with harmonised supervision rules. 
24 Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 December 2002 
on insurance mediation, OJ L 9. This Directive provides regulation of the sales of insurance 
products by agents and brokers, from motor insurance to life insurance and insurance related 
investment products. 
25 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II), 
OJ L 335/1. This Directive provides prudential regulation in relation to standards on for 
example risk management, disclosure and asset valuation. Revisions were made in March 
2014, see http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/solvency/future/index_en.htm (last 
accessed 14 Mar. 2014) via the Omnibus II Directive: Directive 2014/51/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 amending Directives 2003/71/EC and 
2009/138/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 
1095/2010 in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority 
(European Securities and Markets Authority) OJ L153/1 
26 Directive 2014/91/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 
amending Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 
2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to 
undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS), as regards 
depositary functions, remuneration policies and sanctions OJ L 257/186. This Directive 
provides the basis of regulation of collective investment schemes establishing investor 
protection through conduct of business, authorisation and operational requirements. 
27 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 
2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, OJ L 174/1. This 
Directive provides for the regulation of the marketing and management of investments 
vehicles such as hedge funds, private equity and investment trusts (i.e. those not covered by 
UCITS). 
28 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 
2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, OJ L 201/1.  This 
provides for organisational and transparency requirements for entities that enter into any form 
of derivative contract. 
29 Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 
concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services and amending Council 
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current reform initiatives, much of it prompted by the financial crisis, with, for 
instance amendments to the IMD, to ensure proper regulation of insurance sales, 
advice and transparency, with further conduct of business rules31 and recent 
amendments to UCITS, to ensure clear liability and duties in relation to investors.32 
This is connected to the Packaged Retail Investment Products Initiative, (known as 
‘PRIPS’) which has resulted in the proposal and adoption of a Regulation on key 
information documents for investment products, the idea behind the initiative being to 
reduce fragmentation and inconsistency, particularly in relation to pre-contract 
transparency and sales regulation in this sector.33 In addition, the MiFD is replaced by 
MiFD II,34 together with updated rules35 ( ‘MIFR’) mostly applicable from January 
2017, which aim to ensure transparency, adaptation to changing products, reinforced 
supervisory powers and stronger protection for investors.36 SOLVENCY II has also 
been reviewed with further changes coming into force.37 These directives attempt to 
bring a unified approach to the regulation of financial services, and it is for this reason 
that PRIPS and the SOLVENCY II projects were launched.38  
 
At their heart, all this legislation, shares similar aims of overall efficiency of the 
financial system, an efficient competitive single market and consumer protection. 
Take, for example, the aim of the MiFD, which is framed as the creation of a coherent 
and risk sensitive framework which protects investors,39 or the SOLVENCY II 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC, OJ L 271/16. 
30 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on 
credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ L 133. 
31 IMD 2 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insurance 
Mediation ( recast)’ COM (2012) 360/2 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/consumer/mediation/index_en.htm  (last 
accessed 14 Mar. 2014), now called the Insurance Distribution Directive.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
32 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-736_en.htm?locale=en (last accessed 14 Mar. 
2014); Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as 
regards depositary functions, remuneration policies and sanctions (2012/0168 (COD). 
33 EU Commission Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: Packaged Retail Investment Products COM (2009) 204 final. 
Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 November 2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based 
investment products (PRIIPs) OJ L352 34	  Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on 
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 
2011/61/EU OJ L 173/349. This repeals the previous Directive of 2004- Directive	  2004/39/EC	  
35 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 OJ L 
173/84 OJ L 12/1 
36 http://europa.eu/rapid/midday-express-12-06-2014.htm?locale=en 
37 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35 of 10 October 2014 supplementing 
Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and 
pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II). See also Omnibus 
Directive II supra fn 25. 
38 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-736_en.htm?locale=en (last accessed 14 Mar. 
2014); EU Commission Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council: Packaged Retail Investment Products COM (2009) 204 final, 2;  
39 Repeated in MiFD II Recital (4).	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Directive, part of the SOLVENCY II project, where here the main objective of 
insurance/re-insurance regulation and supervision is the protection of policy holders 
and beneficiaries.40 There are however distinctions to be made between these various 
pieces of legislation, in relation to underlying purpose. For although as a group, they 
have similar targets, most are bounded in their regulation, each dealing with a specific 
type of financial product and/or the service that offers it. Whilst there is some 
overlap,41 investment services offering certain types of financial products (e.g. 
shares/bonds/derivatives) are primarily covered by the MiFD, insurance is covered by 
SOLVENCY II and the IMD, insurance special purpose vehicles are covered by the 
Re-insurance Directive, collective investments schemes by UCITS, and so on. A 
further categorisation can be made in terms of the basis of regulation. There are those 
that primarily provide prudential control, such as the SOLVENCY II and the 
Financial Conglomerates Directive,42 and those that primarily provide conduct 
regulation, for example the IMD, and the DMFSD. The MiFD is however an example 
of a Directive which could be seen as a conjunction of these approaches. Whilst it 
does not provide prudential regulation in the form of detailed capital requirements,43 it 
does contain organisational requirements in relation to compliance, risk management, 
and internal control as well as its conduct of business provisions, based in general 
principles. The regulation of consumer credit also sits as a separate area of 
regulation.44 However it is firmly based in conduct of business rules, without any 
attempt at micro prudential control. This may be set to change, at least in some 
degree, with the introduction of CARRP. 
 
Regulation of Credit 
 
In 2007 the single market review was launched. The commission document ‘A Single 
Market for a 21st Century Europe’45 both celebrates the progress and success of the 
single market and highlights the difficulties that arise from attempting to establish a 
unitary market across a number of jurisdictions. Evolution of markets in effect 
underlies much of the problem facing this goal,46 whether through innovation in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Directive 2009/138/EC Recitals (16); see also 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/insurance/docs/solvency/solvency2/faq_en.pdf (last 
accessed 14 Mar 2014). 
41 For example the DMFSD covers a number of different financial services offered at a 
distance, certain investments are covered both by MiFD and UCITS, certain types of 
derivatives are covered by the EMIR and MiFD, and the regulation of investment 
management is covered by MiFD and AIFMD.  
42 Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 
on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and 
investment firms in a financial conglomerate and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 
79/267/EEC, 92/49/EEC, 92/96/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 93/22/EEC, and Directives 98/78/EC and 
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council,   OJ L 35, 11.2.2003. 
43 Apart from initial capital requirements in relation to authorisation, see Article 12. 
Otherwise MiFD firms are generally covered by CRD IV. 
44 Although it should be noted the DMFSD does also cover distance credit agreements 
45 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Single 
Market for 21st Century Europe COM(2007) 724 final.  
46 Commission of the European Communities Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions A Single Market for Citizens: Interim Report to the 2007 Spring 
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relation to products, external global factors, such as the financial crisis, or social 
‘realities’ of the Member States’ citizens.47 However, implementation, enforcement, 
and simplification, are all concepts mooted as the way forward. The aim is to ‘foster 
flexibility and adaptability while maintaining the legal and regulatory certainty 
necessary to preserve a well-functioning single market.’48  
 
The Green Paper on Retail Financial Services49 sets out how these aims are to be 
achieved in retail financial services. Lack of effective competition and fragmentation 
of markets are seen as problems that should be ‘dealt’ with to allow the opening of 
markets.50 Prudential regulation at an EU level is seen as aiding delivery of a single 
market allowing consumer and investor protection.51 Further objectives are to reduce 
prices, increase choice, enhance consumer confidence and empower consumers, with 
mention of a fair open competitive market. There should be ‘appropriate’ regulation 
of new products, and creation of a level playing field whilst maintaining quality of 
products.52 This entails a ‘global approach’ to consumer rights across the EU53 and 
access to quality retail financial services. Interestingly at this time emphasis seems as 
much centred on ensuring the better functioning of markets, as providing further 
regulation. That being said, it seems that the means of achieving improved 
functionality is felt, potentially, to lie in harmonising regulation, integration and co-
operation rather than freedom from regulation. 
 
Retail financial services include consumer and mortgage credit. At the time of the 
Green Paper, as far as consumer credit was concerned, the reform to the original 
consumer credit directive, was to ‘promote the emergence of a genuine single market 
in consumer credit while ensuring a high level of consumer protection.’54 The CCD 
was adopted in 2008 and should by now have been fully transposed into national 
laws. In terms of mortgage credit however, reform has taken longer. The White Paper 
on Mortgage Credit, referred to as a planned initiative in the earlier Green Paper,55 
was produced later that year.56 Its aim was to ‘facilitate the creation of an integrated 
market for mortgage credit’57 so promoting cross border activity, product diversity, 
and improved consumer confidence.58 However, secured credit, whilst the subject of 
initiatives such as a voluntary code of conduct,59 a Green Paper on Mortgage Credit60 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
European Council COM(2007) 60 final, at 3. 
47 Commission A Single Market for 21st Century Europe supra n. 45, at 3. 
48Ibid. at 4. 
49 Commission of the European Communities Green Paper on Retail Financial Services in 
the Single Market COM (2007) 226 final. 
50 Ibid. at 6. 
51 Ibid. at 4. 
52 Ibid. at 9,12. 
53 Something that features in the EU Commission’s earlier White Paper in 2005, see 
Commission of the European Communities White Paper Financial Services Policy 2005-2010 
(COM(2005) 629 final),at 16. 
54 Commission Green Paper on Retail Financial Services, supra n.49, at 12. 
55 Ibid. at 10. 
56 Commission of the European Communities White Paper on the Integration of EU 
Mortgage Credit Markets COM(2007) 807 final.  
57 Commission Green Paper on Retail Financial Services, supra n.49, at 10. 
58 Commission White Paper on Mortgage Credit, supra n.56, at 4-5. 
59 see http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/home-loans/code_en.htm ( last 
accessed 14 Mar. 2014). 
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and mortgage dialogue61 did not have its own regulation until last year. This is as a 
result of the Proposal for a Credit Agreements Relating to Residential Property 
Directive being adopted by the Commission in 201162 and, after detailed 
consideration, CARRP being finally adopted by the European Parliament on 4 
February 2014.63 The Directive has a targeted approach to harmonisation, with some 
measures being of a full harmonisation nature, whilst in relation to others, Member 
States are free to be more restrictive.64 Transposition is to take place by March 2016 
in most respects. 
 
The stated incentive for introducing regulation in relation to secured lending on the 
home, is the financial crisis, tackling irresponsible lending,65 with the underlying 
rationale to create an internal market for mortgage credit offered on residential 
property, whilst providing a high level of consumer protection.66 The Directive covers 
most credit,67 which is secured on residential immovable property or a right related to 
such property. It would therefore include any charge over property whatever its 
priority.68 There are detailed requirements as to information provisions (advertising, 
general information, pre- contract, information relating to credit intermediaries and 
appointed representatives, adequate explanations, the basis of APR calculation, 
changes in borrowing rates)69 and other requirements such as assessment of 
creditworthiness,70 rights of early repayment71 and a guaranteed period of reflection 
before being bound by the agreement.72 However, it is not just the mechanics of the 
transaction itself that are covered. There are also clear targets for financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Commission of the European Communities Green Paper: Mortgage Credit in the EU 
COM(2005) 327 final. 
61 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/home-loans/miceg/tor-en.pdf 
(last accessed 14 Mar. 2014). 
62 Commission of the European Communities Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Credit Agreements relating to Residential Property 
(COM(2011) 142 final). 
63 Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 
on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending 
Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ L 60/34. 
64 Preamble para. 7. 
65 Preamble para. 4. 
66 Preamble para. 5. See also Commission of the European Communities Commission Staff 
Working Paper: Summary of the Impact Assessment: Accompanying document to the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements 
relating to residential property SEC (2011) 355 final. For a detailed discussion of the 
development of policy underlying recent EU consumer credit regulation see Iain Ramsay 
Changing Policy Paradigms of EU Consumer Credit and Debt Regulation in Stephen 
Weatherill and Dorota Leczykiewicz The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation 
Free movement and Competition Law (Oxford Hart) (2015) ( forthcoming) 
67 Some specific types of lending are excepted, for example equity release vehicles, Art. 
3(2)(a) or where the credit is interest free Art. 3(2)(c). 
68 The CCD does not cover secured lending on property at all. However the UK CCA covers 
second charge mortgages on residential property, first mortgages on residential homes being 
covered by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Regulation of second charge 
mortgages is now the responsibility of the FCA along with other consumer credit. 
69 Arts 10–11, 13–17, 27. 
70 Art. 18- 20. 
71 Art. 25. 
72 Art. 14(6). 
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education,73 detailed measures relating to the competence of credit providers,74 
supervision75 and restrictions on certain practices.76  
In some respects, the proposals of CARRP follow the structure of the CCD, with 
strengthened provision in relation to assessing creditworthiness, enhanced information 
requirements, and greater emphasis on education of consumers. However CARRP 
indicates a change in approach, which stretches beyond simply including another form 
of credit (i.e secured lending) within regulation. As was mentioned above, current 
consumer credit regulation is not framed on the same basis as many other financial 
services, in that there is no reference to prudential matters, other than ‘appropriate 
supervision’ of creditors.77 Whilst not part of the consumer acquis, the CCD’s 
approach, like the DMFSD, has much in common with the other regulation within the 
acquis, focusing on traditional methods of consumer protection from conduct and, 
indirectly, through information provision, from terms, that may be harmful.78 
Emphasis in transparency, for example, is evidenced in the CCD by the requirement 
for detailed pre-contract and agreement information, and the creditor’s duty to give 
adequate explanations about the credit to the borrower, and distributive measures are 
included via the fourteen day right of withdrawal.79 The deviation demonstrated by 
CARRP lies in the basis of the regulation. For whilst the CCD is in effect ‘rules-
based’, CARRP includes a ‘principles-based’ approach. This is demonstrated through 
general conduct of business principles enunciated in Article 7, where it is stated 
Member States are to require creditors to act ‘honestly fairly transparently and 
professionally’ in relation to the consumer.80 Furthermore fairness was not something 
directly addressed in the CCD but in effect left to the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive81 (‘UCPD’) and Unfair Contract Terms Directive;  it was otherwise 
indirectly addressed, primarily through information provisions. This is not the case in 
relation to CARRP. The Article then gives further guidance, making specific 
reference to consumer circumstances and assumptions of risk, and to remuneration 
policies, which are consistent with these principles.  In addition prudential measures 
are included through indemnity insurance requirements82 and Member States’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Art. 6. 
74 Art. 9. 
75 Arts 5, 9(4)–(5). 
76 Namely tied practices Art. 12. 
77 CCD Preamble para. 44, Art. 20. 
78 Through means of information disclosure and withdrawal provisions. 
79 The same as, for example, the Consumer Rights Directive, which replaces the Distance 
Selling and Doorstep Sales Directives. The Consumer Rights Directive contains detailed 
information requirements and a cancellation period together with other protection against 
specific unfair practices such as overcharging for methods of payment. Other examples are 
the Council Directive 90/314/EEC on package travel, package holidays and package tours, 
which also employs information provisions and rights of cancellation. Of course in terms of 
conduct and terms the ‘over-arching’ Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive will also be relevant. 
80 This includes, in relation to advisory services- ‘in the best interests of consumers’ Art. 
23(3)(d). 
81 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 
on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ L 
133/66, Preamble para. 18. 
82 For credit intermediaries Art 29(2)(a). 
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monitoring of markets.83 These differences indicate an interesting development in 
protection for the credit consumer, as it demonstrates a more ‘comprehensive’ 
approach to control, encompassing more than the provision of conduct and 
information rules.84 
The Proposal through the various stages of discussion and amendment, was, needless 
to say, subject to criticism, for example by the Committee on Legal Affairs, Member 
States such as the UK, and the industry. Serious doubts were raised as to the extent of 
powers delegated to the Commission,85 whether the proposed directive would be 
effective in addressing the financial crisis, and whether an internal market in credit 
agreements secured on residential property can, in reality, be established.86 Mortgage 
markets are regarded as endemically local in nature,87 with cross border demand being 
low, and there was some concern the Proposal would not effectively address this 
issue.88  This however was not the only criticism of the proposed new Directive. A 
‘blanket bomb’ approach to information provision is no longer seen as the way 
forward. As the FCA has pointed out,89 in relation to its own re-visitation of mortgage 
lending rules, the information provision should reflect what the consumers actually 
want/need, in order to make an informed choice, with less emphasis on transparency 
as protection, and concentration on affordability assessments and sales standards. 
Consistency with the CCD is also seen as essential, in order to avoid burdensome 
administrative costs,90 particularly as some Member States already apply provisions 
of the CCD to mortgage lending.91  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Art. 26, Preamble para. 26: the prudential nature of the requirements are specifically 
referred to in Art. 1 and Preamble para. 8. 84	  This	  distinction	  is	  identified	  by	  Ramsay	  as	  a	  symptom	  of	  the	  changing	  political	  landscape.	  Ramsay	  Changing	  Policy	  Paradigms	  supra	  fn	  66	  
85 European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs Opinion of the Committee on Legal 
Affairs for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on the proposal for a directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on Credit Agreements Relating to Residential 
Property (2011/0062(COD), 3.  
86 Ibid. at 3. 
87 See for example the view of the UK FCA: 
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/international-markets/eu/mortgage-credit-directive (last 
accessed 14 Mar. 2014). See also Ramsay supra fn 66 
88 European Banking Federation Preliminary EBF Position on the Proposal for a Directive on 
Credit Agreements Relating to Residential Property (31 Jan 2012)  
http://www.ebf-fbe.eu/uploads/D0962B-2011-EBF-
Preliminary%20position%20on%20the%20Proposal%20for%20a%20Directive%20on%20cre
dit%20agreements%20relating%20to%20residential%20property_f.pdf (last accessed 14 Mar. 
2014). 
89 FCA Mortgage Credit Directive ‘Questions Answered’ 
http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/international-markets/eu/mortgage-credit-directive (last 
accessed 14 Mar. 2014). 
90 This is especially important as a number of Member States already provide the CCD 
provisions to some secured lending EBF Preliminary EBF position supra n.88 para 8.1. See 
for example the UK’s CCA and secured lending on land, where whilst excepted from the 
provisions, creditors were given the option to apply various provisions if they wished e.g. 
Consumer Credit (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2010/1013. 
91 As specifically allowed by the Directive. For recent judicial confirmation of this see SC 
Volksbank România SA v Autoritatea Naţionalăpentru Protecţia Consumatorilor – 
	   12	  
 
Upon observing the adopted directive, whilst now generally seeming to be welcomed, 
although with some reservation, (certainly in the UK),92 it is not clear that these 
concerns have been met. The information provisions remain extensive, and whilst in 
many respects reflect what is already contained in the CCD, it is not clear how this 
will interact with the current SECCI contained in CCD provisions, which may have 
already been applied to secured lending by some Member States.93  There are minor 
differences, for example the definition of consumer94 and a less prescriptive approach 
to compensation allowances on early repayment.95 These may be regarded as 
insignificant, but the Directive is still potentially problematic in other respects. For 
example, Article 7(3)(b) requires remuneration policy of creditor staff to be in line 
with the ‘business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the creditor..’ 
but can this in truth be completely consistent with a high level of consumer 
protection? Whilst there is a qualification that any remuneration policy should include 
‘measures to avoid conflict of interest’ there will always in truth be an element of 
tension between the objectives and interests of supplier and consumer. Furthermore in 
relation to pre-contract information the obligations fall back on requirements of 
‘without undue delay’ and ‘in good time’96 – how are these to be measured? The 
provision of adequate explanations is heavily qualified within Article 16 (2) in that 
Member States ‘may adapt the manner by which [the explanations are] given…to the 
circumstances of the situation in which the credit agreement is offered…’. This seems 
a sensible compromise but will potentially generate different levels of protection in 
different Member States. This could also be said about other derogations, such as the 
flexibility in the advertising content,97 the time period (beyond a minimum of seven 
days) for consumer reflection98 or indeed the approach of targeted harmonisation as a 
whole. Perhaps most surprisingly, one area where consumers can suffer more 
detriment than any other i.e enforcement of the loan and foreclosure, has little 
protection beyond a general statement that Member States are to ‘encourage’ (my 
emphasis) creditors to ‘exercise reasonable forbearance before foreclosure 
proceedings are initiated’.99  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Comisariatul Judeţeanpentru Protecţia Consumatorilor Călăraşi (CJPC) (Case C-602/10) 
[2012] C.M.L.R. 45. 
92 http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/media/press/3494 (last accessed 14 Mar. 2014) although this 
may be because in effect little will change in relation to the UK regulation. See also HM 
Treasury Implementation of the Mortgage Credit Directive Summary of Responses Jan 2015 
93 See for example the concerns of Austria: Council of the European Union Item Note, 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements 
relating to residential property (Mortgage Credit Directive- MCD)- Approval of final 
compromise text’ 2011/0062 (COD) 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st08/st08894.en13.pdf (last accessed 14 Mar. 
2014). 
94 The Directive adopts the definition contained in the CCD (natural consumer acting outside 
his trade, business or profession) but the Preamble specifically refers to dual-purpose 
contracts as eligible-Preamble para. 12. 
95 Art. 25. 
96 Art. 14. 
97 Art. 11(3). 
98 Art. 14(6). 
99 Art. 28. This does not really reflect the more detailed concerns  outlined in the Premble at 
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These issues prompt the question as to whether the Directive will be able to fully 
achieve its objectives. Whilst the provision on adequate explanations and assessment 
of creditworthiness go some way towards ensuring responsible lending, these will 
only be effective if suitable sanctions are in place. Similar requirements are already 
contained in the CCD, but as experience in the UK has shown, for example in relation 
to payday lending, levels of compliance are not assured.100 Of course, unlike the 
CCD, which referred to ‘optimum conditions’ for both suppliers and consumers, 
‘optimal’ consumer protection is not the goal being chased here, only ‘high’ consumer 
protection. It could be argued this is, indeed, attainable. However, it may be that 
problems lie not so much in the potential inconsistencies that emerge from the 
Directive’s provisions themselves, but from underlying premises on which it is based. 
Creating a smoothLY functioning market, 101 may not be the same as achieving a truly 
efficient market, internal or otherwise, unless the rights and interests of all market 
actors are to be considered. There seems to be an attempt to accommodate this, but it 
has to be recognised that these interests are not always compatible. Whilst ‘confident’ 
consumers are more likely to participate, which naturally is to the advantage of 
suppliers, there is inevitably a point at which the supplier’s ultimate interest (making a 
profit) will impinge upon complete consumer protection, seen as the answer to 
consumer under-confidence in the market. After all, in one sense at least, ‘profit’ of 
one party will inevitably be at the expense of another.  
Current Drivers in relation to Regulatory Reform 
As has been mentioned, there appear to be three issues that have and continue to 
dominate rationale for regulation of financial services; the financial crisis,102 cross 
border shopping, and closely connected to both these, consumer confidence (all of 
which, of course, impact on the stability and efficiency of the internal market). The 
basis of current reforms rely heavily as their justification on the recent financial 
turmoil103 with a harmonised approach to regulation and supervision being presented 
as the best form of control. Promotion of cross border shopping is used as a reason for 
new initiatives, particularly in relation to consumer confidence.104 To a certain extent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
para 27. Of course it is hoped that the provisions providing for responsible lending in the 
Directive will reduce the need for foreclosure in any event. Commission of the European 
Communities Commission Staff Working Paper National measures and practices to avoid 
foreclosure procedures for residential mortgage loans Accompanying document to the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on credit agreements relating to residential property SEC(2011) 357 final 
100 OFT, Payday Lending Compliance Review Final Report (March 2013), at 10. The industry 
has been subject to detailed review and investigation since the FCA has taken over the OFT’s 
role. This has resulted in specific rules and price controls see FCA Policy Statement Detailed 
Rules for the FCA Regime for consumer credit Including feedback on FCA QCP 13/18 and 
‘made rules’ PS14/3 (Feb 2014) ch 5 and FCA  Detailed rules for the price cap on high-cost 
short-term credit - Including feedback on CP14/10 and final rules PS14/16 (Nov 2014) 
101 Preamble para. 5. 
102 Although there has been some cynicism from industry as to the EU mortgage credit 
market’s role in the crisis http://www.eurofinas.org/uploads/documents/press/pr-
110331%20Mortgage%20Credit.pdf (last accessed 2 April 2014). 103	  Ramsay	  Changing	  Policy	  Paradigms	  supra	  fn	  66	  
104 Thomas Wilhelmsson, The Abuse of the ‘‘Confident Consumer’’ as a Justification 
for EC Consumer Law 27 Journal of Consumer Policy 317-337 (2004) at 318. A good 
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a unitary framework across the EU is compatible with these aims-as the Green Paper 
on Financial Services Interim Report stated cross border shopping has made it 
important to empower consumers effectively and reduce fragmentation.105 There are 
however potential difficulties in achieving efficient unification in order to realise 
these aims. A truly unified framework, it is argued, comes through harmonisation. 
Whilst minimum harmonisation provides a baseline, maximum harmonisation has 
been seen as the tool by which the internal market can truly be achieved.106 Arguably, 
however, harmonisation is not working.107 Permitted regional approach to 
implementation and transposition reduce the ability of directives to effect coherent 
change to national laws,108 and ambiguities in the legislation lead to diversity in 
national courts’ interpretation of provisions.109 The concept of ‘targeted’ full 
harmonisation, (in effect a compromise) merely adds to this problem, whereby in 
certain respects, or in relation to certain provisions, Member States are in effect left to 
their own devices.  
Certainly maximum harmonisation is not universally popular. Counterarguments are 
founded in the view that minimum harmonisation is sufficient110 and that maximum 
harmonisation is supplier orientated111 and that it may actually result in lower 
protection for some consumers, if not utilised appropriately.112 From a prudential 
regulation point of view maximum harmonisation is also seen as inflexible in terms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
example of this is the promotion of consumer empowerment framed as one of twelve ‘levers’ 
needed to boost growth and strengthen confidence Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions Single Market Act Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen 
confidence "Working together to create new growth" COM (2011) 206 final. (April 2011) 
para. 2.4. 
105 EU Commission Green Paper on Retail Financial Services supra n 49, 2, 3, para. 4.3. 
106 On the basis of Art. 95- EC ( Art 114 TFEU) Hans W Micklitz, The Targeted Full 
Harmonisation Approach: Looking Behind the Curtain in Geraint Howells and Reiner 
Schulze (eds), Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law, 51-52 (Sellier 
European law Publishers 2009). The regulation of credit is a good example of this. The 
Preambles to both the CCD 2008 and CARRP refer to maximum harmonisation as the tool to 
be used to ‘create’ an internal market: CARRP Preamble para. 7, CCD 2008 Preamble para. 9. 
107 For an argument in favour of Regulations rather than Directives (but only in relation to 
cross-border transactions) see Christian Twigg-Flesner, Good-Bye Harmonisation by 
Directives, Hello Cross-Border only Regulation? — A Way Forward for EU Consumer 
Contract Law 7 E.R.C.L. 235-256 (2011) 
108 For example national terminology inevitably invites divergence, see Twigg –Flesner, 
Good-Bye Harmonisation by Directives supra n. 107 at 244.  
109 Elizabeth Hall, Geraint Howells & Jonathon Watson The Consumer Rights Directive: An 
Assessment of its Contribution to the Development of EU Consumer Contract Law 8 E.R.C.L. 
139-166 (2012) at 166  
110 Certainly as a base line: Geraint Howells and Thomas Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law: 
Has It Come of Age? 28 E.L. Rev. 370-388 (2003) at 378 and in relation to consumer 
confidence in contracting Geraint Howells & Reiner Schulze, Overview of the Consumer 
Rights Directive in Geraint Howells & Reiner Schulze, Modernising and Harmonising 
Consumer Contract Law, 8 supra n 106. 
111 Sefa M Franken, The Political Economy of the EC Consumer Credit Directive in Johanna 
Niemi, Iain Ramsay and William C Whitford (eds), Consumer Credit Debt and Bankruptcy: 
Comparative and International Perspectives 129-152 at 130-131 (Hart, 2009). 
112 For example in relation to contractual remedies Howells & Schulze, Overview of the 
Consumer Rights Directive supra n. 101 at 24. 
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being able to react to changing circumstances in individual Member States.113 Further, 
EU wide rules are seen as too unwieldy and unyielding in relation to smaller national 
institutions.114 Demonstration of these problems was evidenced in the negotiations 
surrounding the Consumer Rights Directive. The initial aim was to replace four 
directives in the consumer acquis, namely the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, the 
Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees Directive, the Distance Selling 
Directive and Doorstep Sales Directive.  The eventual product fell far short of the 
initial vision, covering only the latter two Directives, as there were deep concerns 
raised by a number of Member States;115 the fact the proposed Directive was founded 
in full harmonisation had much to do with this.116 These same problems arose in 
relation to CARRP, which was subject to a lengthy negotiation process117 before final 
agreement in April 2013, with approval of the text by the EU Council in May 2013, 
118 and finally adoption by the European Parliament and Council nearly a year later.  
Whilst it cannot be said maximum harmonisation is seen as inappropriate for all types 
of control, 119 it seems there is only qualified confidence in such measures delivering 
effective consumer protection. However it is not just the confidence of Member States 
that is at issue but the confidence of consumers themselves. Diversity lies not just in 
regulation but in more integral aspects of the consumer market, the most obvious 
being culture and language. The Green Paper on Financial Services targeted ‘differing 
regulatory and consumer protection frameworks’ as creating  ‘legal and economic 
barriers to market entry’, but it also recognised consumer behaviour and preferences 
limit market integration.120 There is certainly evidence to support the notion that 
culture and language will inevitably prevent true integration of consumer markets;121 
harmonisation will be ineffective in changing this, as this is an identity issue that 
cannot be resolved by imposing a single set of rules across the board.122 This is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 The single rulebook, proposed by the De Larosiere report had run into some difficulties, 
with Member States wanting to retain a degree of flexibility in relation to national markets. 
114 The proposed answer to this is to allow proportionality of approach with lighter touch 
application of rules as appropriate Andrea Enria, Banking Supervision- Towards an EU Single 
Rule Book, Speech to Belgian Financial Forum (5 Dec 2011), Brussels, at 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/27032/Belgian-Financial-Forum-Banking-
Supervision---Towards-an-EU-Single-Rulebook---Brussels-5-Dec-
2011.pdfhttp://www.financieelforum.be/FinancialForum/DOC/1049.pdf (last accessed 1 April 
2014). 
115 Sarah Brown, European Regulation of Consumer Credit, supra n. 9, at 58. 
116 Hall, Howells & Watson, The Consumer Rights Directive: An Assessment, supra n. 109. 
117 Commissioner Michael Barnier acknowledged the process as not always being an easy one 
http://europa.eu/rapdi/press-release_MEMO-13-365_en.htm (last accessed 1 April 2014). 
118 Council of the European Union Mortgage Credit: Council confirms agreement with EP (8 
May 2013) 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/137053.pdf (last 
accessed 1 April 2014). 
119 For instance the final agreed draft of CARRP that went to the European Parliament 
contains agreed maximum harmonisation measures, such as pre-contractual information and 
disclosure of the APR. 
120 EU Commission Green Paper on Retail Financial Services, supra n. 49 at 6, Ramsay 
Changing Policy Paradigms supra n 66 
121 Niamh Moloney How to Protect Investors: Lessons from the EC and UK, 20-21 (CUP 
2010). 
122 Twigg-Flesner, Good-Bye Harmonisation by Directives, supra n. 107 at 240; Indeed it has 
been argued the ‘core’ of EU identity lies in the important contribution of the diversity of 
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only a consumer phenomenon; the behaviour of banks themselves in interbank 
lending at the end of 2011 demonstrated a ‘parochial’ approach.123  
The whole question of consumer behaviour is a tricky one in terms of providing real 
protection and to what extent it is possible to guard consumers against bad, or 
perceived to be bad decisions. 124 The conundrum however, perhaps, is not only how 
to change that behaviour, but whether we should.125 Consumers do not necessarily see 
the need to purchase financial products cross border;126 there is no guarantee that 
changes to the rules will change this status quo. However these are not the only 
aspects to reform that raise questions. The framework of control is also an important 
ingredient and introduction of a general principles-based approach, rather than 
reliance on formulaic rules, to questions of conduct are now in evidence in relation to 
consumer credit. Prima facie the introduction of a baseline of good behaviour will 
provide fairness for the consumer and confidence in service providers. However, 
whether a principles- based approach can achieve the high level of consumer 
protection desired is not clear-cut. It is this approach however that is now being 
adopted in the UK in relation to consumer credit, it already being the basis of 
regulatory control for other financial services.  
 
Regulation of Financial Services in the UK 
Regulatory and Supervisory Structure 
The regulation of financial services in the UK currently operates under two distinct 
schemes. Most types of financial services come under FSMA,127 whereby if a supplier 
engages in a regulated activity it must be authorised, unless exempt.128 Activities such 
as deposit taking, investment services and some forms of secured lending are 
included. The form of control here is ‘principles’ based, i.e. the regulatory control is 
based in a set of general High Level Principles, with detailed rules covering specifics, 
contained within rulebooks designed for particular types of activity; for example the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘languages, social structures and cultures’ Cristina Poncibo, The Challenges of EU Consumer 
Law (EU Working Papers MWP 2007/24), EU Institute MaxWeber Programme 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/7359/MWP-2007-24.pdf (last accessed 1 April 
2014); generation of confidence needs more than simply rules, rather it is dictated by ‘a 
complex social construction’ Cristina Poncibo, Some Thoughts on the 
Methodological Approach to EC Consumer Law Reform 21 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 353-371 
(2009) at 362. 
123 Enria, Speech, Belgian Financial Forum supra n. 105. 
124 Alemanno argues that behavioural science should be integral to policy making. LSE blogs 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/06/26/eu-behavioural-insights-policies/ (last accessed 
1 April 2014). 125	  Ramsay	  Changing	  Policy	  Paradigms	  supra	  fn	  66.	  	  
126 EU Commission Special Barometer 373, Retail Financial Services Report (Mar 2012), at 
5. 
127 As amended by the FSA 2012 and the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. 
128 The exemption relates to particular individuals or organisations engaging in regulated 
activities without needing to be authorised- this includes for example investment exchange 
and dealing houses (s. 285), appointed representatives (s. 39) and members of designated 
professionals (s. 327).  
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Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook ‘ICOBS’129 and the Mortgage and Home 
Finance Conduct of Business Sourcebook (‘MCOB’). The conduct regulator is the 
FCA. Consumer credit, until the transfer to the FCA, was supervised by the OFT and 
primarily regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (‘CCA’), as amended by the 
Consumer Credit Act 2006, and CCD together with the relevant secondary regulation 
dealing with inter alia, exemptions,130 advertising and details on information 
provision. Secured lending on land is, at present, covered by the CCA unless 
exempt.131 Specific provisions for such lending are provided in Pt VIII, which relate 
to form, content and provision of copy documentation. However, for some secured 
lending on the home, (primarily first mortgages that constitute regulated mortgage 
contracts under the FSMA), the provisions of FSMA apply, such lending being seen 
as a regulated activity. As such then, secured lending straddles both sets of regulatory 
framework.  
Reform of the regulatory and supervisory framework underpinning consumer credit is 
underway, as part of a wider reframing of financial services regulation, as the current 
system is regarded as allowing duplication of regulation and fragmentation of 
control.132 This brings consumer credit, including second charge lending, under the 
umbrella of the new regime now in place for all other financial services, in order, it is 
stated, to simplify the regime and bring flexibility, in terms of products and reaction 
to market changes.133 The new financial services regulatory regime consists of a 
macro-prudential authority, the Financial Policy Committee (within the Bank of 
England) and a micro prudential supervisor- the Prudential Regulation Authority. 
Conduct is dealt with by the FCA (which also has some prudential functions). These 
two bodies have replaced the Financial Services Authority, so introducing a ‘twin 
peaks’ regulatory model,134 and the FCA has taken over supervision of consumer 
credit from April 2014. This means that, for example, responsibility for licensing has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Other conduct of business rulebooks, include COBS (Conduct of Business Sourcebook), 
MCOB (Mortgage Conduct of Business Sourcebook) and BCOBS (Banking Conduct of 
Business Sourcebook)- all to be found in the FCA Handbook. 
130 Here exemptions are based in what rules do not apply to the credit provision- for example 
business lending over £25,000 is exempt. 
131 As originally allowed for by ss 16-16C of the CCA 1974 and relevant secondary 
regulation, now by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities Order) 
2001/544. Exempt agreements will however be subject to other regulation for example 
FSMA.  
132 HM Treasury BIS, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Transferring Consumer 
Credit to the Financial Conduct Authority, supra n. 2 at 3. 
133HM Treasury, Consultation on Reforming the Consumer Credit Regime, supra n. 1 Exec 
summary at 5; HM Treasury Transferring Consumer Credit to the Financial Conduct 
Authority, supra n. 2 para. 1.4. 
134 There has been much detailed commentary on the new system and regulation, see for 
example, Eilis Ferran, The Break Up of the FSA 31OJLS 455-480 (2011); Laura Cox, Betsy 
Dorudi, Liz Gordon, John Newsome, Gerald Stadelmann, Andrew Strange, Vincent 
O’Sullivan, United Kingdom Regulatory Reform: Emergence of the Twin Peaks 95 C.O.B. 1-
33 (2012); Iain MacNeil, Regulatory Reform Takes Shape 5 L.F.M.R. 161–163(2011); Lista 
M Cannon, Paul Adams, Twin Peaks Regulation 162 NLJ 440 (2012); James Smethurst, Twin 
Peaks: Bridging the Gap. Co-ordination under the New Regulatory Framework 1 B.J.I.B. & 
F.L. 33 (2012); Graeme Baber, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: A Step in the 
Correct Direction? 33 Comp. Law. 3–12 (2012). 
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transferred to the FCA, translating into Pt IV permissions for authorised activity.135  
One purpose of reform is presented as provision of a ‘new credible regime for conduct 
regulation’,136 with ‘intensive issues-based supervision’, ‘proactive intervention’ and 
‘credible deterrence through enforcement’, 137 underpinned by ‘judgment-led, focused 
and effective regulation’.138 
Inevitably, perhaps, these revisions raise questions as to whether they can really 
achieve the stated aims of the reform agenda in terms of supervision. The challenges 
are seen as being able to effectively ‘police entry into the market’ and be proactive 
within a responsive regime with improved ‘market oversight’.139 Certainly there were 
problems with the licensing system under the CCA, which relied on ex post action by 
the OFT, through incomplete or imperfect information gathering.140 The authorisation 
process of the FCA is regarded as more robust in that it relies not only on more 
vigorous examination before deeming a provider suitable, but also on continued 
monitoring though regular reporting requirements.141 However, there is no guarantee 
the authorisation process will protect the consumer any more than the licensing 
procedure- recent events have taught us authorisation does not necessarily deliver 
good behaviour.142 Whilst the new regime will deliver ongoing monitoring in a way 
the previous framework did not, it depends for its success both on the skills of the 
regulator, the relationships established with product providers and reliance on the 
suppliers of services ‘buying in’ to the obligations introduced via the High Level 
Principles;143 the potential weaknesses that arise have been demonstrated by the mis-
selling scandal of PPI in the UK.144  
It is not however simply the supervisory structure that is going through what has the 
potential to be major change. There is also a complete reworking of the consumer 
credit regulation, with much of the consumer credit legislative regime now replaced 
with a FSMA style rule-book, (‘CONC’) which will regulate the conduct of the 
industry. These reforms should provide uniformity and coherence145 within financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 HM Treasury, Transferring Consumer Credit to the Financial Conduct Authority, supra n. 
2 Ch. 3. 
136 HM Treasury/ BIS, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Building a Stronger System 
(Cm 8012) para. 1.13. 
137 Ibid. para. 1.14. 
138 Ibid. para. 1.15. 
139 HM Treasury, Consultation on Reforming the Consumer Credit Regime supra n. 1 
Executive Summary, at 5. 
140 Ibid. at 11. 
141 Ibid; FSA, CP13/7 Consumer Credit Regulation – Our Proposed Regime 14 
http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/consultation-papers/fsa-cp137 (last accessed 1 
April 2014). 
142The mis-selling of PPI in the UK being a prime example. For a discussion of this see Eilis  
Ferran, Regulatory Lessons from the Payment Protection Insurance Mis-Selling Scandal in 
the UK 13 E.B.O.R. 247-270 ( 2012).  
143 Julia Black, Martyn Hopper & Christa Band, Making a Success of Principles-Based 
Regulation Law and Financial Markets Review 191-206, 200 (May 2007). 
144 Ferran, Regulatory Lessons, supra n. 142. For a case study of regulation of PPI within the 
context of G20 principles and neo-liberalism policies see Toni Williams, Continuity not 
Rupture: The Persistence of Neo-liberalism in the Internationalisation of Consumer Finance 
Regulation in Therese Wilson International Responses to Issues of Credit and Over-
indebtedness in the Wake of Crisis (Farnham, Ashgate 2013) 145	  HM Treasury, Transferring Consumer Credit Regulation, supra n. 2 at 6.	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services as a whole, by reflecting a similar approach within one regulatory structure. 
Many aspects of the two regimes can be reconciled relatively easily,146 although 
accountability mechanisms, such as joint and several contractual liability,147 and 
unenforceability of agreements where there is found to be an unfair credit 
relationship,148 are a little more problematic. FSMA, relies on disciplinary sanctions 
rather than individual redress (although this is allowed where rules have been 
breached via breach of statutory duty action)149 and this is an issue yet to be dealt 
with. 150 The other major change, prompted by CARRP, is the transference of second 
charge lending from the general provisions of consumer credit, to the mortgage 
lending rules under MCOB.151 Here uniformity and coherence are indeed served, in 
that all secured lending, whether a first or second charge on residential property will 
now be regulated by one set of rules, and CARRP, whilst attracting some cynicism,152 
aligns with the UK Government’s approach in this respect. This does not mean to say 
however, that the reform will be trouble free. Protections not covered by the 
Directive, and peculiar to the CCA, such as unenforceability where an unfair credit 
relationship exists,153 will no longer apply.154 However, whilst it is recognised there 
are differences between first and second charge markets, the amalgamation of secured 
lending for the purpose of regulation seems to have been welcomed.155 
 
Principles versus Rules-Based Regulation  
FSMA is principles and outcomes based; CCA is rules based. Regulation under 
FSMA operates on the foundation of a set of high level principles which are designed 
to underpin the more detailed controls provided by the detailed Rules contained in the 
FCA handbook. Sanctions are uniform with disciplinary action for breach of 
Principles and a private action for breach of statutory duty where rules are 
contravened. A rules-based regime however, is not informed by stated principles but 
addresses individual issues in a more compartmentalised way. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by means of an example. The CCA tackles transparency by providing self-
sufficient rules on what should be provided at various stages of the transaction 
process, with specific sanctions for transgression. The FCA handbook contains 
business standards (Rules) within its various conduct of business source books, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  As reflected in the CCD, some of these protections are based in information provision: advertising, 
detailed information requirements both pre-contractual and at the inception of the agreement together 
with ensuring access to agreement information during the life of the loan.	  147	  S. 75 CCA which allows for creditor liability upon breach of contract of the supplier goes 
further than the equivalent contained in Art. 15 of the CCD 	  148	  Allowed	  by	  ss	  140A-­‐C	  CCA	  149	  E	  Lomnicka	  The	  Future	  of	  Consumer	  Credit	  Regulation;	  a	  chance	  to	  rationalise	  sanctions	  for	  
breaches	  of	  financial	  services	  regulatory	  regimes?	  34	  Comp.	  Law	  1	  13-­‐21	  at	  16,	  20-­‐21,	  (	  2013)	  150	  HM Treasury, Transferring Consumer Credit to the Financial Conduct Authority, supra n. 
2 paras 2.8–2.9, Annex B.	  151	  Buy-­‐to-­‐let	  lending	  is	  also	  	  affected	  by	  transposition	  of	  CARRP	  but	  this	  is	  primarily	  via	  legislative	  amendment	  -­‐HM	  Treasury	  Summary	  of	  Responses	  ch	  4	  supra	  fn	  92	  	  152	  HM	  Treasury	  Summary	  of	  Responses	  supra	  n	  92	  para.	  1.3	  153	  Supra	  fn	  148	  154	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(‘COBS’) which include requirements in relation to, for example, provision of 
information. These Rules however are interpreted in accordance with the underlying 
Principles termed as ‘fundamental obligations’ of firms.156 These extend beyond the 
Principle that firms must communicate information in a fair and clear way which is 
not misleading, (PRIN 2.1.1(7))but might also involve conducting business with 
integrity (PRIN 2.1.1(1)) due skill and diligence (PRIN 2.1.1(2)) proper standards of 
market conduct (PRIN 2.1.1(5)) or treating customers fairly (PRIN 2.1.1(6)).  
Furthermore, compliance with the Rules does not necessarily mean the Principles 
have been observed.157  
The principles-based approach is promoted as more flexible and protective, in that it 
does not allow for ‘loopholes’ or creative compliance.158 However it relies on 
providers being willing to observe the Principles159 and the regulator ensuring they are 
observed. In contrast a rules-based approach provides a more specific structured 
approach to consumer protection, and could be argued to provide more certainty, 
particularly for suppliers.160 However, it can prove to be unwieldy and by its nature is 
less flexible; filling the gaps leads to piecemeal reform and layering of rules.161 The 
CCA is a good example of this, with successive reforms, leaving the legislation in a 
confused state not least in relation to small business borrowing.162 One might argue 
therefore that the principles-based approach provides a simpler, more adaptable 
system. However, the reality of principles-based regulation is that in practice, it looks 
very like a rules–based approach. Interpretation of the Principles, have to be 
addressed by rules, which in turn have to be addressed by further guidance. The Rule-
book therefore ends up as a detailed document, with a mixture of enforceable rules, 
and ‘non-enforceable’ guidance to assist interpretation. Whilst it is true it is easier to 
amend these Rules to reflect the changing nature of markets, as opposed to amending 
legislation which must go through a parliamentary process, these ‘clarifications’ of 
the Principles provide almost as voluminous a set of requirements to be observed as 
legislation; the amended MCOB, produced as a result of the Mortgage Markets 
Review163 is a good example of this, and much of the OFT guidance being 
incorporated within the CONC, 164 only reinforces this impression; as rules and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 PRIN 1.1.2. 
157 Regina (British Bankers Association) v. Financial Services Authority and another [2011] 
EWHC 999 (Admin) 1570. 
158 Black et al, Making a Success of Principles-based Regulation, supra n. 143 at 193. 
159 Iain MacNeil An Introduction to the Law on Financial Investment, 97-98 (2nd ed, Hart 
2012). 
160 Ibid. 
161 Black et al, Making a Success of Principles-based Regulation, supra n. 143 at 193. 
162Sarah Brown, Protection of the Small Business as a Credit Consumer: Paying Lip Service 
to Protection of the Vulnerable or Providing a Real Service to the Struggling Entrepreneur? 
41 C.L.W.R. 59-96 (2012). 
163 Prompted by concerns about risky lending practices, the FSA undertook a comprehensive 
review of the mortgage market. The result was a reform to the rules regulating mortgage 
lending, with for example moving responsibility for assessing affordability to lenders and 
amended ‘consumer friendly’ information requirements. These new rules to all intents and 
purposes came into effect in April 2014. 
164 FCA, CP 13/7 High-level Proposals for an FCA Regime for Consumer Credit 
Consultation Paper para. 2.4 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/cp/cp13-07.pdf (last accessed 
1 April 2014). 
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guidance become more expansive, this inevitably makes inroads into flexibility.165 
There is some recognition of this potential problem. The UK Government 
consultation paper accepted that there needs to be a graduated and adapted approach 
to consumer credit, with a ‘tailored’ assessment of risk approach to the application of 
requirements.166 However in many respects it is reasonable to conclude that in effect 
the only real difference between the current framework ‘based’ on Principles and that 
‘based’ in rules, is not the volume, or simplicity/flexibility of obligations and 
requirements, but the remedies and sanctions available. 
Questions of Coherence and Convergence 
As we have seen the UK is moving towards a single approach, not quite a one size fits 
all, but an attempt to rationalise the law in relation to consumer protection and 
financial services including credit. In contrast, regulation in the EU in respect of the 
credit market, is seemingly being subjected to yet more sector specific control. This 
creates duplication with the CCD, and yet at the same time, the potential for conflict. 
Whilst to a certain extent this could be dealt with via exemptions, duplication created 
by sector specific directives is something already observed as a potential problem in 
other financial services regulation at an EU level, as is demonstrated by the recent 
ECON consultation on ensuring the coherence of EU financial services legislation.167 
Piecemeal reform only exacerbates this problem. The answer may be to merge 
CARRP’s new requirements with the CCD; in effect this would provide a move closer 
to the new regime being introduced in the UK. However the UK is going much further 
than this- bringing the control of consumer credit under the umbrella of all financial 
services. Whilst there are separate Rules for mortgage credit and unsecured lending, 
this prima facie will provide a simpler more coherent regime, clearing up anomalies 
created by, for example, second charge lending and overdrafts.  
There are however questions that arise as to how far this single approach is suitable. 
As one UK consultation paper accepts, the balance and risk between consumer and 
supplier in the consumer credit market is different168 from other financial services 
providers as lenders ‘bear the capital risk’ unlike for example consumers as 
depositors, although of course if creditors fail, this will have an effect on the market, 
and competition, potentially leading to consumer detriment. Certainly there are 
arguments for treating financial services separately from other consumer products and 
indeed for recognition of distinct business model within the financial services market 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Black et al, Making a Success of Principles-based Regulation, supra n. 143 at 198, which 
in itself raises issues of uncertainty in relation to stakeholders internal compliance 
mechanisms. 
166 For example a tiered approach to the grant of permissions, lower requirements for lower 
risk firms and the recognition prudential requirements are not always appropriate HM 
Treasury, Transferring Consumer Credit Regulation, supra n. 2 at para. 1.26. 
167 European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs- Public Consultation 
Questionnaire for the public consultation on the coherence of EU financial services 
legislation  at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/subject-
files.html?id=20130314CDT63219#menuzone (last accessed 1 April 2014); Linklaters MiFID 
II. Key Interactions between MiFID/MiFIR II and other EU and US Financial Services 
Legislation (July 2012) http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/MiFIDII/Pages/MiFIDII.aspx 
(last accessed 1 April 2014). 
168HM Treasury, Transferring Consumer Credit to the Financial Conduct Authority, supra n. 
2  para. 1.23. 
	   22	  
itself.169 It has been suggested there is a difference between consumers and 
investors,170 or that they are treated separately by the law.171 In a recent report on 
consumers and investment,172 it was made clear that it was not just limited available 
information or literacy that caused consumer detriment but also instinct driven 
choices, such as ‘herding’ or inertia, falling back on traditional methods of purchasing 
products (such as relying on advisors) with little appetite for switching providers or 
cross-border purchase.173 These could be seen as sector specific dangers requiring 
tailored protection. Does this however extend to compartmentalisation within 
financial services to the extent of a separate regulatory regime for credit? Dangers in 
relation to investment that have been highlighted lie in the unique nature of consumer 
needs and behaviour and the inherent risk involved, with ‘opaque’ pricing, product 
complexity174 and long duration of agreements.175 This is also characteristic of 
consumer credit, yet there is a difference in the nature of credit; the multi- faceted 
purpose of this particular subset of finance makes it potentially more difficult to 
control. This is not in the sense of regulation keeping up with innovation (although 
this can be a problem) but rather the fact that the consumer takes on credit for a 
variety of reasons. Unlike investment products (where essentially the goal is to make 
money ‘work’ for the investor), or insurance, where the purpose is protection against 
specified risks, or even basic banking services, where the aim is to provide a safe 
deposit of money, credit is taken out for any number of reasons, from the pursuit of 
pleasure to dire need. The careful balance to be had between allowing consumers to 
pursue advantages (however fleeting) that they can afford, with protecting those who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 In the responses to the European Parliament’s public consultation on enhancing the 
coherence of European financial services legislation, insurance providers expressed some 
concern at imposition of banking regulatory initiatives on the insurance industry- see for 
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http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201306/20130624ATT68248/201306
24ATT68248EN.pdf, The German Insurance Association (GDV) 
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25ATT68454EN.pdf (last accessed 1 April 2014). 
170 For a discussion of investors as consumers see e.g. Cristina Amato, Chiara Perfumi 
Financial Investors as Consumers: Recent Italian Legislation from a European Perspective in 
James Devenney, Mel Kenny (eds), Consumer Credit Debt and Investment in Europe (CUP 
2012); Niamh Moloney, The Investor Model underlying the EU’s Investor Protection Regime: 
Consumers or Investors? 13 E.B.O.R. 2 169 (2012); Dimity Kingsford Smith, Financial 
Services Regulation and the Investor as Consumer in Geraint Howells, Iain Ramsay & 
Thomas Wilhelmsson, with David Kraft (eds), Handbook of Research on International 
Consumer Law (Edward Elgar, 2010). 
171 Peter Cartwright, Banks Consumers and Regulation, 4 (Hart, 2004); cf Amato & Perfumi 
Financial Investors as Consumers supra n. 176 ; Moloney, The Investor Model, supra n. 176 
at 169-193. 
172 Nick Hater, Stefan Huck & Roman Inderst, Consumer Decision-Making in Retail 
Investment Services: A Behavioural Economics Perspective Final Report (Decision 
Technology Ltd, November 2010) 
ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/docs/final_report_en.pdf ‎ (last accessed 2 April 2014). 
173 See also EU Commission, Retail Financial Services Report supra n. 126. 
174 Hater et al, Consumer Decision-Making in Retail Investment Services supra n. 172 at 582-
585. 
175 Jacqueline Minor, Consumer Protection in the EU: Searching for the Real Consumer 13 
E.B.O.R. 163–168 (2012). 
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have no choice, is a difficult one to be made. Consumer credit raises wider issues of 
financial exclusion and vulnerability, (whatever that may mean)176 arguably justifying 
a more ‘bespoke’ approach. Acknowledgement of this is seen in the Preamble to 
CARRP which openly refers to the ‘specificity of credits related to residential 
immovable property’.177 
There have been many recent developments in consumer protection law at the EU 
level. Generally, the reforms seek to bring together various aspects across the 
consumer spectrum, distilling rules that are perceived as successful into one 
regulatory instrument. The Consumer Rights Directive is an example of this, by 
bringing together the doorstep selling and distance selling regulations, and the 
Common European Sales Law demonstrates attempts to use this approach in relation 
to contract law. The desire for a single coherent market and high level of consumer 
protection are the driving forces behind these initiatives, although to what extent these 
initiatives have or will be successful remains to be seen. However consumer credit as 
a financial service is excluded from these ‘umbrella’ measures, in the same way it 
stands alone within financial services regulation. Interestingly there is now a call for 
retail banking to be separated from investment banking activities for the very reason 
that the separation is required to protect consumers. 178 Nevertheless, within mortgage 
credit provision, the basis of regulation is showing a greater level of coherence with 
other financial services regulation and the changing nature of regulation within the 
UK. CARRP introduces a principles-based approach and fairness as a stated element 
to consumer protection, closer to the principles- based approach adopted by other 
financial services directives, promoted by the Lamfalussy Report,179 where general 
expectations of behaviour were presented as an underlying basis to control.  
This also reflects the changing nature of regulation in the UK, where principles-based 
regulation is to apply to financial services as a whole. There is also some similarity in 
terms of the underlying rationale of regulation. Whilst a high level of consumer 
protection is evident as an aim, the Recitals to the latest draft of CARRP demonstrate 
the driving force is the promotion of the internal market and cross border activity. 
Consumer confidence (and therefore protection) are required to achieve this. It is 
interesting to note that whilst an earlier draft of the proposed directive adopted by the 
EU Commission, required creditors and their intermediaries to act in ‘honestly fairly 
and professionally in the best interests of the consumer’180 this appears to have been 
qualified in the latest text finally agreed with the EU Parliament, where now lenders 
are required to ‘take account’ of these ‘rights and interests’ in Article 7(1) rather than 
purposively putting the consumer first. When considering the FCA objectives there is 
arguably a sense that the emphasis of consumer protection is in reality to help protect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 All consumers can be seen as vulnerable at some level, for example where there is a lack 
of transparency. 
177 Preamble para. 23.	  
178 Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Draft Report on Reforming the Structure 
of the EU’s Banking Sector, Rapporteur Arlene McCarthy (8 Mar 2013) at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
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180 EU Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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the market as opposed to protecting the market to ensure consumer protection. Indeed 
general language of UK policy papers often reflects that to be found in comparable 
EU documentation, for example the Green Paper and White Paper on Financial 
Services advocating a fair open and competitive market. Whilst it is arguable the 
objectives are complementary –there is always potential for conflict; ensuring the 
interest of consumers are met, can prove problematic for also ensuring the financial 
integrity of service providers.181 The difficulty lies in getting the balance right.                                                                                                                                                                       
Conclusion 
What then is the observable trend in the latest developments of consumer credit 
regulation? There is no doubt that the financial crisis has spurred on reform to 
regulation of the financial services industry, both in the EU and the UK and within 
that, credit regulation. With this comes reform not only in relation to rules but how 
the protection is delivered. There is a new concentration on the role of supervision 
and the emergence of a drive towards unification of the supervisory structure. 
However whilst prudential requirements and control of credit institutions move 
towards a single overarching supervisory framework, sector specific treatment of 
financial services is still in evidence. This is particularly illustrated by the latest 
amendments to the general consumer credit regime, with the introduction of CARRP. 
For whilst the Directive introduces elements of regulation familiar to other financial 
services, it does so within the confines of secured lending, rather than to consumer 
credit as a whole. 
The rationale of introducing CARRP is to instigate change by ensuring an internal 
market in secured lending, to curb irresponsible lending and to allow consumers to 
borrow cross-border with confidence. However, although initially being met with 
some resistance, it seems after much deliberation and negotiation the resultant product 
is regarded as having little potential to create much impact on the UK mortgage 
market. Whilst the ‘jury may still be out’ for some industry stakeholders, on balance it 
seems the prevailing view is little will change.182 This however may be because the 
approach in the UK has already gone through a process of reinvention, reflected in the 
approach being taken in Europe. The further regulatory reform of the UK consumer 
credit market may however itself prove to be tricky, for whilst consumer credit 
regulation in the UK has been prescriptive in nature, and rules-based, financial 
services regulation is principles-based. Reconciling these approaches, particularly in 
relation to remedies, is a delicate task if consumer protection is to be maintained and 
enhanced. It is arguable the move towards principles-based regulation raises a 
question of potential inconsistency, but it is not just here that problems may arise. The 
competing goals of creating an efficient market that is fair for all its participants 
create a tension that is difficult to manage. As the UK Government itself recognises, 
delivering a coherent and inclusive policy is desirable but challenging,183 and it is not 
easy to see how a policy based so deeply in a ‘proportionate’ approach, can truly say 
it has consumer protection at its heart. 	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This opportunity for a new regime allows for a rationalisation of the law and in terms 
of allocation of supervisory responsibility this is to be welcomed. The regulatory 
framework itself however may be a different matter. By its very nature, there may be 
justification in treating consumer credit differently to other financial services. 
Consumer credit reflects consumer’s vulnerabilities to a greater extent than other 
financial services: essential but expensive for the poor, potentially dangerous for the 
unwary. If it is serious about comprehensive consumer protection, it must retain a 
focused approach to unfairness and a range of remedies that will allow this. In terms 
of the EU push for reform in secured lending, fair treatment of the consumer is framed 
within credit legislation for the first time. Whilst the CCD did not address unfairness 
directly, CARRP now enunciates the requirement to treat consumers fairly, by means 
of the establishment of a general principle under Article 7. In this sense it moves away 
from the regulatory basis of the CCD by providing a mixture of general principles that 
Member States should ensure creditors observe, as well as prescriptive rules. 
Furthermore it introduces basic micro-prudential requirements, which again reflect the 
approach of the High Level Principles in the UK and also bring it closer to the model 
of other financial services directives.  
EU regulation of credit, certainly in relation to secured lending, seems to be changing 
direction, its inclusion of micro-prudential control and general principles of conduct 
more closely reflecting similar developments in the UK and the goal of providing a 
level playing field for all consumers in relation to secured lending on residential 
property may be seen as a valiant one. The question is whether, in the quest for an 
internal market, this will necessarily enhance consumer protection. There are firm 
arguments for the supervisory role to be rationalised, but beyond this it must be 
recognised various sectors within financial services exhibit differences that should be 
accommodated in any regulation. Conversely whilst the sector specific nature of 
directives remains, there will always be the potential for clash of policy and 
incoherence in regulation, with duplication and complexity real dangers. These same 
arguments apply to the changes being brought about in the UK. Whilst there is indeed 
an observable convergence of approach in terms of regulation of credit with respect to 
the changing EU and UK landscape, policies and reform must be progressed with 
care.  
